By Emma Emeozor
Certainly, the international community was caught unawares by the row between the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Ukraine that made the West African country to cut off diplomatic ties with the Eastern European nation
Bamako had alleged that Kyiv gave support to the Tuareg rebels who ambushed and killed dozens of Malian soldiers, including some Russian Wagner mercenaries in the northern Kidal region in late July, this year.
Bamako’s angry reaction was a response to the revelation made by the Ukrainian Intelligence agency’s spy spokesman who said the Tuareg rebels had the “necessary information” to execute the July attack.
According to Malian government, the comment made by the Ukrainian Intelligence agency’s spy spokesman was a clear evidence of Ukraine’s complicity in the operations of the rebels, thus undermining the territorial integrity of the country.
Mali’s government spokesperson, Colonel Abdoulaye Maiga, while explaining the raison d’être of the government’s reaction, said they were “deeply shocked” to hear the claims adding that Ukraine had “violated Malian sovereignty” by aiding the “cowardly, treacherous, and barbaric attack.”
The government of Ukraine was quick to deny the allegation, saying Mali was “hasty” in taking its decision. In a statement, its foreign ministry said Mali took action “without conducting a thorough study of the facts and circumstances of the incident … and without providing any evidence of Ukraine’s involvement in the said event.”
Interestingly, the crisis was further escalated by the decision of the government of the Republic of Niger to cut off ties with Ukraine in solidarity with Mali. The Mali-Ukraine row has since elicited debate among experts and watchers of Ukraine-Russia war who believe that it is the root of Kyiv’s clandestine activities in the internal affairs of the West African country.
In this report, Amadu Sesay, Professor of International Relations, examines the action of Ukraine and its implication for Sub-Sahara Africa. He also faults the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) for failing to react to Ukraine’s interference in Mali.
Mali cut off diplomatic ties with Ukraine following comments by Ukrainian intelligence spy agency’s spokesperson that the Tuareg rebels that ambushed and killed dozens of Malian troops including Russian Wagner mercenaries had the “necessary information,” indicating that Ukrainian military aided the rebels in the July attacks. Niger also cut off ties with Ukraine in solidarity with Mali. What is your reaction to this development?
I think I need to go back a little bit into history before I can comment on the present situation between Ukraine and Mali, or indeed, the Sahel region and West Africa in general, in order to answer your question. Ukraine was for many an integral part of what was the called the USSR or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, from 1922 until the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991.
So for almost 70 years, Ukraine was not actually an independent State as such, since it was part and parcel of the then USSR. I think it is very important to take note of that historical trajectory. The other point worth noting is that when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991,
Ukraine, became an independent state, and inherited a lot of Soviet era arms and ammos, because it was important Soviet era arms dump, and at that period, Ukraine did not hesitate to dispose of the “surplus” weapons to whoever was ready to purchase them. The armoury in question had tanks, armoured personnel carriers, assorted armoured vehicles, small arms light weapons, and even “left-over” aircrafts, among many other lethal weapons.
It is worthy of note that after its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine was in dare need of money, and as a result, it became a ‘rogue state’ of sorts, because it did not have any scruples selling arms to any buyers-State and Non-state actors, in the developing countries, but most especially in Africa, South of the Sahara.
As a result, the region became a dumping ground of Russian weapons.
Besides that, Ukrainians also offered their services as mercenaries in some conflicts in sub-Sahara Africa, and. were ready to fight side by side with the forces of State or Non-state actors that were ready to pay for their services. Thus in a way, Ukraine already has a history of meddling in Africa’s conflicts.
A clear example was the involvement of Ukrainian mercenaries in the civil war in Sierra especially in the early 1990s on side of the rebel Revolutionary United Front, RUF, which was fighting the government of Sierra Leone, although they were also involved in the diamond business.
So what is significantly different this time is that Ukraine is itself involved in a vicious and debilitating war with Russia, one of the great powers, since February, 2022. The pertinent question that I will try to answer later is: why would it side with rebel forces seeking to overthrow the government of Mali in West Africa?
Was such intervention strategic or foolhardy, or what a compatriot jocularly described as “acting dumb in Africa.” (Yusuf Bangura, during a WhatsApp chat early in August 2024). It is pertinent to
sate here also that before 2022, Russia had invaded parts of Ukrainian territory, most famously the Crimea region in 2014, which is of strategic importance to both the Kremlin because of its all-weather port. Russia needed Crimea because most of its own sea ports are frozen in winter, and therefore needed access to weather facilities.
Finally, it is also important to note that Ukraine, unlike France, Britain or other colonial and post-colonial powers, it had no history of serious engagements with African countries.
With the above background, one can argue that Ukraine’s intervention in Mali on the side of the Tuareg rebel forces and Jihadists in the Northern part of the country is of very little strategic significance, contrary to what the spokesperson for its Defence Ministry, Andriy Yusof, would want us to believe.
On the contrary, I would argue that the intervention was reckless, because it is was a reflection of the old and unfashionable saying that ‘my enemy’s friend is my enemy’, which is no longer fashionable in a world that is incredibly interconnected in the 21st century.
There are several reasons for my position.
First, and perhaps most importantly, is that Ukraine is itself enmeshed in a destructive war with its much bigger and stronger neighbour, as noted earlier.
Second, and flowing from that, is the fact that it has depended overwhelmingly on the support western countries, mainly America and the EU for weapons and cash; rockets, tanks, f16 fighters. America and its NATO allies have also expended billions of dollars in cash to support its war effort, and it reasonable to argue that it would not have been able to prosecute the war thus far without such commitment and support from its “friends” in Western Europe and America.
Third, some of the EU financiers have started to raise concerns about the cost of the war and their continuing financial commitments to Ukraine. As democracies they are sensitive to public opinion at home.
In such a situation, I think its involvement with rebel forces in Mali and consequently opening another front in Africa, will surely divert its limited resources to a conflict in Africa, simply because Russia is assisting the central government in Bamako to ward off the Tuareg rebels and their affiliates.
At the more strategic level, Ukraine will need the political and diplomatic support of African counties at different international and regional for a in its campaign to isolate Russia, It is noteworthy that the Africa group in the UN is made of 55 countries, the largest block in the world body.
Kiyv would need Africa’s support in the UN on future resolutions against Russia in that body. In West Africa where Mali is located, especially is the Economic since we have the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS),
Although Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, have left the organisation, the bloc can still play an important role at the UN and in the African Union (AU) at the political and diplomatic levels, so Ukraine cannot really afford to antagonize this group of States by meddling militarily in the region, given its fragility, and porous borders, by destabilising any of its neighbours.
I do not think that Ukraine’s intervention in Mali will make a lasting impact on the long standing conflict, but only add to the misery and suffering of the people in that country.
Where is its knowledge of the socio-cultural and political terrain of Mali? Very little. What advantage does Ukraine hope to gain in Mali against in its war with Russia in short and medium term or even in the long run?
Again not much. I dare to say that what Ukraine has done in Mali is akin to attempting to cross a river without testing its depth. It will surely regret its action in the long run for some of the reasons provided earlier.
What is your comment on Ukraine’s reaction to Niger’s decision to cut off ties with it in solidarity with Mali?
We should not expect Ukraine to boldly come out and admit its involvement in Mali. That will be against international law and the UN Charter, which bar interference in the internal affairs of states. International law and the UN also preach good neighbourliness.
Openly admitting that it had interred in Mali’s long standing war against the Tuareg rebels and their Jihadist allies in the North of the country would also be undiplomatic. However, on July 29 this year, the Wagner group confirmed that it lost some of its men in an encounter with the Tuareg and Jihadist rebels in the north of the country.
So I think that Ukraine was trying to do damage control to prevent Burkina Faso from breaking diplomatic relations with it because there was overwhelming evidence that Ukrainian mercenaries have been fighting with the Tuareg rebels that are bent on overthrowing the government of Mali, which has been going on for more than a decade. Kyiv was probably trying to prevent a situation whereby other countries in West Africa would sever ties with it in protest against its intervention in Mali.
How do you feel about the failure of African Union to react?
Like ECOWAS, the AU has also denounced the support Ukraine has given to the Tuareg and their jihadists in the north of the country. But I am also not surprised that the condemnation did not go far enough. This may be due to several factors or reasons. The AU and ECOWAS are run on string budgets.
Both the AU and ECOWAS depend substantially on external funders, especially the EU and the US, the so-called development partners, for more than a third of their annual budgets, because some members are not diligent in paying their assessed annual contributions.
Since America, the EU and NATO countries are the major backers of Ukraine in its war with Russia, it will not be politically correct for the AU to openly take a very strong stand against Ukraine, sadly. Many African countries have their fingers in the mouths of these very countries, which has seriously weakened their voices and their roles in international politics, even within Africa.
It is noteworthy that the AU relies on support for some of its policies and programmes, including the full operationalisation of the Africa Standby Force, on EU countries and America. This is one major reason it has not been able to decisively intervene in African conflicts, including that in Mali.
This was why the former Tanzanian leader, Julius Nyerere once described the OAU, the AU’s predecessor, as a toothless bulldog. Nonetheless, I think that African organisations remain symbolic scare crows, especially for the political elite, and I am using the phrase very advisedly.
The present reality is that until African countries, their regional and continental bodies get their acts right, they will not be able to win the respect of other state or non-state actors, or occupy the front seats in global affairs, even on issues that directly affect them and their people.
I think another angle we should look at is the role of France. Is France actually the unseen hand in the Ukrainian adventure in Mali? France was disgraced out of the country and for very good reasons too, which I need go in this interview. The Russians are trying to replace France in the three breakaway states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Thus, it will be favourably disposed to play the role of a spoiler in all three states.
I think that this is an aspect that calls for further interrogation as events unfold not only in Mali but also in Burkina Faso and Niger. And if that is so, the AU does not have much room for manoeuvre. I think its hands are tied because the major sponsors of the Ukrainian war efforts against Russia are Europeans and Americans.
The lesson, to me, from the foregoing, is that if you do not put your house in order, if you depend on other countries or organisations for the realisation of even
your own domestic programmes, you cannot quarrel with those countries, it will be akin to biting the hand that feeds you. I think that is just the point.
So, I am not surprised at the lukewarm response of the AU and ECOWAS to the Ukrainian aggression against Mali. But even if both bodies were to make strong statements on Ukraine’s intervention in Mali, what is the weight of such pronouncement? It is possible that Ukraine, and may be its backers, took all these weaknesses of the African States and their organizations, into consideration before it decided to dabble in the domestic affairs of Mali. That is my take. It may be wrong. But that is how I look at the situation from my own point of view for now.
