The military takeover in the Republic of Niger on July 26, 2023 marked the latest of a series of coups that have rocked the Sahel region in recent years. Their democratic president, Mohamed Bazoum, was detained and soon after, ousted from office, much to the consternation of an already-tensed region.
Only about two weeks prior, Nigeria’s newly elected President, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, assumed office as the Chairman of ECOWAS with a glowing promise to promote peace and stability in the region. Niger was to become the first project in his diplomatic laboratory. Ultimatums for reinstatement of the ousted president of Niger swiftly turned into punitive sanctions and in the absence of deference from Niger, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) threatened military intervention.
In ECOWAS defence, the Sahel region was fast becoming a breeding ground for political instability; citizen uprisings and military coups had become fairly commonplace, and political class was apprehensive.
This was especially so for the ECOWAS Chairman who had only recently assumed office as Nigeria’s President amidst controversy and legal battles. President Tinubu had a lot to prove but no sooner had the ultimatums been made, the states of Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso counter-threatened to pull out of the Community effectively. Diplomatic engagements broke down and countersanctions such as closure of the Niger airspace and threats of military engagement in defence of Niger’s territorial integrity’ were rolled out.
On the Nigerian end, much was at stake: (a) the country was only gradually recovering from an electoral process fraught with irregularities. No further external crises were needed; (b) Nigeria’s economy had taken a hit for months and the closure of the airspace by Niger struck the final blow, increasing the cost of food and travel.
Before then, many did not know how much the Niger’s airspace saved Nigerians in flight fares; (c) Nigeria’s leadership of the ECOWAS at the time was significant and the country needed to make a good showing as the leader within the region, given our history in the formation and development of the regional body.
History of ECOWAS peacekeeping and military interventions
The 1960s are famously acknowledged as the era of political emancipation, independence and self-determination. New nations sprouted from old colonies all over the world and especially, in Africa. Newly independent African states required strong regional cohesion and this was achieved through the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) in 1963. Within West Africa, the arbitrary division of similar indigenous groups into separate states indicated a need for closer cohesion – a foresight of our post-independence political leaders. ECOWAS was then founded through the efforts of Nigeria’s Head of State, Gen. Yakubu Gowon and his Togolese counterpart, Gnassingbe Eyadema to integrate the West African region economically and perhaps, culturally and socially.
The 1975 Treaty of the ECOWAS was thereby formed along those lines of integration. These non-military objectives, being dependent on political stability, forced ECOWAS to birth a military group (ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)) to intervene in conflicts sprouting within the region. Successful interventions were made in Liberia (1990 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea Bissau (1999), Côte d’Ivoire (2003), Mali (2013) and The Gambia (2017), either independently or in support of the UN peacekeeping forces. Two points in relation to the legality of former interventions must be clarified:
First, prior to 1999 when the Lomé Protocol officially established ECOMOG and its activities into force, interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone relied on an invitation by a member state. In fact, since the entry into force of the Lomé Protocol, only the 2017 intervention in The Gambia was based on the Protocol and a resolution of the UN Security Council. This means that although ECOWAS was empowered to initiate military interventions by itself, at the request of the AU or the UN or on the initiative of its Executive Secretary, the request of the member state has been the most common mode of initiating interventions within the region.
Perhaps, the fact that the ECOMOG had achieved successful military interventions before the Lomé Protocol was adopted, led to the continuance of this practice. In essence, ECOWAS is legally empowered to intervene in a member state’s political crisis as long as all procedural steps have been followed.
Second, Niger’s strategy of unexpectedly withdrawing from the regional bloc following its suspension was a reaction that ECOWAS did not see coming. By withdrawing from the ECOWAS, Niger considered itself not to be effectively subject to the objectives of the organisation and thus, any military intervention. However, withdrawal of membership does not operate that way in ECOWAS – at least, by the treaty standards.
To be continued.
Nwarueze is a Lawyer, Rhodes Scholar and international law researcher at University of Oxford. She can be reached at elizabeth.nwarueze@law.ox.ac.uk.
