Over 70,000 Ethiopian refugees are stranded in Sudan amidst escalating conflicts. The complex challenges of repatriating them emphasizes the need for coordinated legal, humanitarian and diplomatic interventions.
On 3 November 2022, the Ethiopian federal government signed a cessation of hostilities with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), following a two-year civil war that started in 2020. A full peace agreement between the parties was signed nine days later on 12 November 2022. Since then, an interim government has been installed in Tigray State by the Federal Government to implement the peace plan, with Getachew Reda, TPLF’s regional head, appointed as the head of the interim government.
The conflict between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, which centred in the northern Tigray region, forced many civilians to flee to neighbouring Sudan. Despite limited resources, the Sudanese government, with the help of international and humanitarian organizations, voluntarily accepted Tigrayan refugees, housing them in Kassala, Gedaref, and Blue Nile states. An estimated 60,000-70,000 people fled Tigray, with many finding refuge in camps in Kassala and Gedaref.
By the end of November 2022, when the cessation of hostilities was signed, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported the presence of 70,935 Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers in Sudan, predominantly Tigrayans. The situation worsened in 2023, when Sudan descended into another civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo also known as Hemedti. Clashes erupted across several states, including Gedaref, home to thousands of Ethiopian refugees.
The deteriorating security situation in Sudan, particularly with RSF attacks on towns near Gedaref, has heightened concerns among refugees. In July 2024, protests erupted in Tigray, with civil organizations demanding the Ethiopian government prioritize the repatriation of Ethiopian refugees stranded in eastern Sudan.
CONTEXT IN SUDAN
After the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 following a coup instigated by the Sudanese Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, al-Bashir’s former aide and Sudanese Armed Forces Chief of Staff, emerged as the de facto leader of Sudan. Efforts to stabilize the domestic situation followed, with a power-sharing agreement between the military council and civilian representatives brokered by Ethiopia, South Sudan, and the African Union in August 2019. This agreement concluded the political rivalry between the Transitional Military Council under General Hemedti and the civilian-led Alliance for Freedom under Ahmed al-Rabie. The deal established a joint coalition with the military ruling for 21 months followed by a civilian-led government for another 18 months until elections could be held in 2022. The council appointed veteran economist, Abdalla Hamdok, as prime minister on 21 August 2019. However, the deal fell apart in 2021 when the Sudanese Armed Forces staged another coup, forcing Prime Minister Hamdok to resign. The coup, led by General Burhan, dissolved the transitional government and introduced a state of emergency throughout the country. The United Nations and the United States responded by retracting $700 million of financial aid to Sudan, and the African Union declared the military government invalid, demanding the return of the transitional government. In November 2021, Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister but remained under the control of Burhan. Massive protests in Khartoum demanding reduced military control were met with repressive military actions, leading to Hamdok’s resignation in January 2022 to stop the military’s repressive measures.
Throughout 2022, military factions and civilian opposition negotiated under the United Nations mediation. In December 2022, it was concluded that the SAF, the paramilitary RSF, and civilian coalitions would broker another deal in January 2023 to discuss the merger of the RSF into the SAF, and transitional justice, security, and accountability reforms. The plan to integrate the RSF into the SAF faced backlash from the militia, leading to open conflict between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, marking the start of another civil war in Sudan.
Five years of unstable domestic and regional conditions in Sudan and neighbouring countries have led to a massive exodus and influx of refugees and internally displaced persons. Despite the political instability, the commissioner for refugees in Sudan, Mufawadeyat al-Laji’in As-Sudan, has responded to the crisis by opening camps at the border to host thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries like Eritrea, Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. These camps have provided shelter despite uncertainties, lack of facilities, and insufficient financial aid.
CONTEXT IN ETHIOPIA
As the second most populous country in Africa, Ethiopia faced significant turmoil in November 2020 when the TPLF, once a dominant political force, found itself in a bitter feud with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The conflict began after the prime minister expelled Tigrayan representatives from parliament following the creation of a new political coalition that excluded representatives from the Tigray state. The situation escalated rapidly as TPLF stormed Federal forces’ garrison in Mekelle, capital of Tigray. In retaliation, TPLF faced overwhelming attacks from Ethiopian federal forces, Amharan and Afar militias, and the Eritrean army, resulting in a mass civilian exodus within the country and to neighbouring countries.
Given Tigray’s location in the northernmost part of Ethiopia, the only feasible escape route for many civilians was to flee to Sudan. These fleeing refugees and asylum seekers found temporary refuge in camps scattered across southern Sudan states of Gedaref and Kassala. As of today, four years have passed since they left their homes, and calls for the repatriation of Tigrayan refugees and asylum seekers have intensified, especially as a new civil war rages in Sudan, with reports of clashes just a hundred miles away from the Tunaydbah refugee camp, which houses thousands of Ethiopian refugees.
Despite the cessation of conflict between the TPLF and the Ethiopian forces in 2022, the task of repatriating refugees and asylum seekers remains challenging. The Ethiopian federal government’s priority to rebuild the Tigray state, logistical difficulties, and the lack of diplomatic negotiations have all contributed to the delays in bringing these displaced people back home.
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SUDAN-ETHIOPIA RELATIONS SINCE 2020
Contemporary relations between Sudan and Ethiopia can be highlighted by three significant events that have brought instability and strained relations: the al-Fashaga border dispute, the contest over Blue Nile River control, and recent internal conflicts. The al-Fashaga area, a 250 square-kilometre piece of disputed land located between Sudan’s Gedaref state and Ethiopia’s Amhara and Tigray states, has a history rooted in the era of British rule over Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1902. At that time, Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia ceded al-Fashaga to the British empire as a means to define the clear border between Ethiopia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The region is vital for both countries due to its agricultural productivity, especially sesame seeds cultivated by Amharan farmers, and its use as a grazing area for Sudanese livestock.
Several attempts to resolve the al-Fashaga border dispute have been made since 2008, with agreements ceding the territory to Sudan while allowing Amharan farmers to continue cultivating the land. However, this arrangement between the federal government and the TPLF fell apart in 2020 during the Ethiopian civil war, when General Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces deployed 6,000 troops into the al-Fashaga territory, reportedly driving out Amharan farmers. This led to clashes between the two sides, and a temporary border demarcation agreement was reached in December 2020.
The Nile River, a lifeline for riparian countries from Egypt all the way south to Tanzania, is another point of contention. Control over the river’s basin is crucial as it can impact water flow to downstream nations, including Sudan and Ethiopia, which control the river’s source. In 2011, Ethiopia announced plans to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) to boost its electrical power capacity. This project faced opposition from Sudan and Egypt, as Ethiopia’s upstream position gives it the ability to control the flow of the Blue Nile, potentially affecting water availability in downstream countries. In August 2020, Ethiopia began filling the GERD, sparking protests from Sudan and Egypt. While Egypt sees the GERD as a potential threat to its water supply, Sudan is caught in a difficult position. Although a fully operational GERD could impact Sudan’s water supply, it also holds potential benefits for future domestic developments.
Recent internal conflicts in both Sudan and Ethiopia have further strained diplomatic relations. In Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces have accused Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Ahmed of supporting the RSF, citing Ethiopia’s strong ties with the United Arab Emirates, a major backer of the RSF; while the Ethiopian federal government accused the Sudanese Armed Forces of exploiting the situation in Ethiopia during Tigray War by deploying troops to the disputed al-Fashaga region and providing safe harbour for high-ranking TPLF members, thereby risking unnecessary escalation between the two countries. Despite these challenges, the African Union and neighbouring countries have made efforts to help de-escalate tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia through mediated talks and diplomatic engagements, particularly concerning the repatriation of refugees and asylum seekers still stranded in Sudan.
LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES
During the peace talks mediated by the African Union and observer countries, the Pretoria Agreement was established. Article 4 of the latter agreement (on Protection of Civilians) notes:
The Parties shall, in particular, condemn any act of sexual and gender-based violence, any act of violence against children, girls, women, and elderly, including recruitment and conscription of child soldiers, and support family reunification.
The Article emphasizes the need to support repatriation, condemning acts of violence and supporting family reunification. Section 3 of Article 5 (Humanitarian Access) states: ‘The Government of FDRE undertakes to facilitate the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees, whenever the security situation permits.’ Despite these legal provisions, significant repatriation efforts did not commence until July 2024, following mass protests and escalating conflict near the refugee camps of Tunaydbah and Um Rakuba.
Ethiopian government-owned media outlet Addis Standard posted on X in July 2024 about the creation of a national repatriation committee to handle stranded Ethiopian refugees amid the escalating conflict. The media outlet quoting Ambassador Nebiyu Tedla, spokesperson for Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claimed that repatriation efforts have been ongoing for the past two years, with 40,000 individuals already repatriated and reunited with their families. However, Getachew Reda, president of the interim administration of Tigray State, urged regional and international influencers to exert pressure on the warring parties in Sudan to cease conflict and prioritize civilian protection.
Conversely, Laetitia Bader, director of Human Rights Watch for the Horn of Africa, expressed scepticism about the repatriation efforts. ‘Some have independently sought ways to leave the camps, but many thousands remain,’ she said, indicating that the Ethiopian government’s efforts are insufficient. She also urged the government to rapidly assess the evacuation and protection strategy for repatriation, highlighting accusations of Tigrayan forces fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces and reports of some Tigrayan refugees being detained by the RSF.
As of today, Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers still stranded in Sudan raise significant concerns. In July 2024, the RSF controlled Wad Madani, the capital of Gezira State, 90 miles away from the Tunaydbah refugee camps, which host a majority of Ethiopian refugees. With no further follow-up on repatriation, the conflict could draw closer to the refugee camps.
The Ethiopian government needs to hasten the preparation of a legal framework to repatriate stranded refugees and asylum seekers. Priority should be given to camps near conflict areas, followed by remaining camps. Diplomatic talks with the Sudanese government should be initiated with the help of the African Union and international humanitarian organizations such as UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration to provide safe passage for refugees and ensure their safe return home and reunification with their families.
Ahsani Maulinardi is a regional analyst based in Jakarta, Indonesia.
